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We would like to cover the following topics. This is not an exhaustive list and if you feel there is something missing that you want to talk about, contact the session chair and your topic will be included here.

Please send talks, brain storm topics, or other proposals to the session leader, DagErlingSmørgrav.

Who Description
MarkMurray /dev/random
BaptisteDaroussin Package signing
SofianBrabez Mitigation
DagErlingSmørgrav VuXML / auditing
UlrichSpoerlein Coverity Scan

(Add a list or attach slides detailing the achieved results here.)

MM absent. DES summarises /dev/random discussion from Cambridge sysctl to choose rng adaptor committed – mostly for HW support. yarrow as fallback Also support for other RNG HW which only input to yarrow 10.x fix known bugs – passing in part of struct that is mostly zeros on 64bit Pawel's patch: in dev attach call binuptime before and after attach and feed delta into yarrow. Entropy estimation? New: Statistical analysis by benl: 4bits entropy per devices conservative estimate[*]. Can commit soon. Important: feed data into yarrow v. early in boot. Need good entropy very early on – eg. generation of ssh keys on first boot Current initrandom script to feed data into yarrow is 'crap' – most of the data is either static or predictable. [*] VirtualBox VM OK, embedded platforms we lack data. Mark Murray will implement fotuna but not for 10.x Embedded systems will probably pre-generate keys. Some have very few devices.

Edward Snowdon – v. high probability of backdoors in some (HW) RNGs. Including elliptic curve generator included in NIST. rdrand in ivbridge not implemented by Intel… Cannot trust HW RNGs to provide good entropy directly. (rdrand implemented in microcode. Intel will add opcode to go directly to HW) This means partial revert of some work on rdrand and padlock – everything will feed into yarrow or fortuna in future. Fortuna doesn't require estimating entropy – big advantage Estimating entropy remaining to system was SotA 15 years ago; not the best way now. Fortuna designed s.t. even if you can influence input, delay before this affects output long enough to make attacks infeasible (3 weeks) Generation of ssh keys on install – bsdinstaller to save entropy / generate keys as last thing Installing system and cloning image? Having some entropy will mean keys diverge.

  • devsummit/201309/security.1380190492.txt.gz
  • Last modified: 2013/09/26 10:14
  • by MatthewSeaman